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An Archaeology of Borders: Qualitative Political  
Theory as a Tool in Addressing Moral Distance1 
 
Luis Cabrera 
University of Birmingham 
 
 
Abstract: Interviews, field observations and other qualitative methods increasingly are 
being used to inform the construction of arguments in normative political theory. This 
article works to demonstrate the strong salience of some kinds of qualitative material for 
cosmopolitan arguments to extend distributive boundaries. The incorporation of 
interviews and related qualitative material can make the moral claims of excluded others 
more vivid and possibly more difficult to dismiss by advocates of strong priority to 
compatriots in distributions. Further, it may help to promote the kind of perspective 
taking that has been associated with actually motivating a willingness to aid by 
individuals. Illustrative findings are presented from field work conducted for a normative 
project on global citizenship, including interviews with unauthorized immigrants and the 
analysis of artifacts left behind on heavily used migrant trails.  
 
* * * 
 
Cosmetics case, black mesh 
Pair of socks, women’s, Mickey Mouse print 
Black rucksack, canvas, partially buried in sand and swarming with red ants 
Bar of green deodorant soap 
Disposable diaper 
Can of baby formula, full 
Jeans, slacks, button-up shirts, brassiere, child’s boxer shorts printed with map of London 
Underground 
Tins, empty and full of tuna, beans, processed meats, jalapeno peppers, bags of pastries, 
sliced Bimbo brand bread, cookies 
Plastic milk jugs half full with murky brown water 
Makeshift stretcher, fashioned from tree branches and clothing.  
 
 
Political theorists increasingly have been conducting original qualitative research, 
including interviews, participant observation, and the collection of field data, to inform 
and enrich their normative accounts (see Nussbaum 2000; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007; 
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Ackerly 2008).  I argue here that the incorporation of specific kinds of qualitative 
material is particularly appropriate for addressing issues of perceived moral distance, and 
for strengthening cosmopolitan arguments to extend distributions of resources and 
opportunities across national boundaries. Such material can help to make the lives of 
excluded others more vivid, their interests and plain humanity more present in the 
theoretical frame. It can challenge common-sense understandings about the depth of 
duties to noncompatriot others, and perhaps most importantly, it can help to make more 
difficult the blithe dismissal of their claims, or the theoretical treatment of their concerns 
or deprivations as self-evidently less pressing than those of individuals who are perceived 
as closer in geographical or relational terms.  
The intervention intended is both methodological and substantive. It is my 
immediate aim to make the case for a broader adoption of the methods of qualitative 
political theory, in particular within the areas of trans-state distributive justice, 
immigration ethics, and related sub-fields which address the exclusions inherent in the 
current global system. The substantive intervention is aimed at both highlighting and 
challenging ways in which some cosmopolitan skeptics, or those arguing for relatively 
strong priority to compatriots in distributions of resources and membership, often only 
superficially acknowledge the interests or human standing of the globally impoverished 
and excluded. I draw on insights from social psychology to argue that the incorporation 
of specific kinds of qualitative material can shrink the perceived moral distance that 
figures in many such non-cosmopolitan accounts, and that it may serve as an important 
step toward more concrete inclusions of those excluded from distributions. To reinforce 
these claims, I present some findings from a normative project on conceptions of global 
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citizenship which has incorporated significant qualitative research, including interviews 
with scores of activists advocating both more and less restrictive immigration regimes, 
and of particular salience, interviews with unauthorized immigrants and the analysis of 
artifacts left on migrant trails near the U.S.-Mexico border. 
  
The Problems of Moral Distance  
A cosmopolitan approach is understood here as one in which individuals, rather 
than states or other groupings, are viewed as morally primary (Pogge 2002, 169; see 
Caney 2005, 3-4), or more precisely, as possessing equal standing as addressees of moral 
justification (Beitz 2005, 17). At minimum, actions deeply affecting individuals’ interests 
must be justifiable to them, irrespective of the interests of any group in which they may 
hold membership. Thus, a cosmopolitan approach presumes that duties to tend to the 
needs or interests of those who share our citizenship or national context are not 
categorically stronger than those to noncompatriots, and in fact some duties to absolutely 
impoverished noncompatriots may be far more pressing (see Beitz 1999; Brock 2005). A 
distinction generally is drawn between moral cosmopolitanism, in which the justice of 
institutions in the global system are assessed according to how well individuals, rather 
than groups, fare within them, and institutional cosmopolitanism. The latter emphasizes 
forms of institutional transformation and creation above the state that could help to better 
secure cosmopolitan aims. It has been associated with proposals for comprehensive 
global political integration, i.e., the world state, but it also has more immediate 
implications for possible regional integration, as in moral arguments for some 
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democratically accountable political integration in the North American region (Cabrera 
2005). 
The specific problem of moral motivation addressed here, that of securing the 
acknowledgment and discharge of duties to distant others, is of central importance to the 
cosmopolitan political theorist. It is generally framed as a problem of moral distance. In 
fact, it may be more appropriately framed as two problems or sets of theoretical and 
practical concerns. The first, related to the acknowledgment of duties, is the problem of 
where to set moral boundaries, i.e., to which set of persons our duties are primarily owed 
(Chatterjee 2003). It is most often discussed in terms of whether strong duties are owed to 
those who are geographically distant (Kamm 2000; see Waldron 2003), or those who are 
relationally distant (Singer 2004), and if so, how strong those duties should be presumed 
to be. Relational distance is most often explored in terms of duties to compatriots versus 
duties to those with whom we do not share state citizenship, though familial duties may 
also be highlighted.  
The second problem of moral distance begins by presuming that individuals do 
owe some relatively strong duties to all others, and it is concerned with how to overcome 
challenges to actually seeing those duties discharged (Lichtenberg 2004; see Meyer 
2000). Such challenges would include to some minor extent any remaining transportation 
or logistical issues in distributing resources across borders, but especially information 
problems and challenges of ordinary human psychology that can serve as barriers. I 
presume that cosmopolitan and other political theory arguments are most concerned with 
the first problem of moral distance, but that such arguments have implications for the 
ways that practical problems arising in the second category should be addressed in public 
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policy. I presume also that the audience for qualitative political theory accounts is not 
limited to political theorists. Thus, references to actually motivating helping behaviors or 
attitudes of inclusion here are focused on the actions of a more general audience, 
including audiences for non-technical public discourses informed by political theory 
accounts.  
Finally, I will note that my primary emphasis is on relational distance, rather than 
plain geographic distance. There are cases certainly in which sudden close proximity has 
led to mercy or aid, at least for some individuals (Glover 1977, Ch. 20; see Waldron 
2003). Yet, other cases highlight ways in which proximity appears to have exerted little 
influence on the treatment of those perceived as relationally different, especially when 
they are in abject circumstances. We can consider horrific examples such as intercultural 
genocide, or more routine and perhaps more generalizeable examples, such as the way in 
which most individuals within even very affluent states may pass daily by the homeless 
without being motivated to offer aid or, alternately, without pressing their public officials 
to more vigorously address the causes of homelessness and related ills. Abject 
individuals, however physically near, may be viewed by the relatively affluent as 
relationally quite distant (Hamblet 2003). 
Further, an emphasis on relational distance is appropriate because of recent trends 
in human mobility that have served to shrink physical distances between many affluent 
and less-affluent global regions. Nearly 200 million individuals are reported to be living 
in a country other than that of their birth, and roughly one-third of those have migrated 
from developing states to developed states (UN 2006). In terms of unauthorized 
immigration, in the United States alone, some 11.8 million persons are estimated to be 
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living without regular status, either as a result of clandestine entry or overstaying a visa 
(Hoeffer, Rytina, and Baker 2007). Of those, more than 80 percent had emigrated from 
Mexico and other relatively impoverished states in Latin America. At minimum, the 
phenomenon of massive unauthorized immigration complicates questions of geographic 
moral distance, while it also provokes a host of relational distributive issues. Those 
would include issues as varied as distributions from the pools of public resources to 
which unauthorized immigrants contribute (Goldberg, Simmerling, and Frader 2007), to 
distributions of the good of membership in the form of guest worker provisions or the 
right to petition for citizenship in the host state over time. 
 
* * * 
 
Birth certificate, Socorro Araceli Natividad Limon, November 26, 1979, Teepeteopan, 
Tehuacan, Mexico 
Letter, young woman to estranged partner 
Waist-high, circular shelter in dry creek bed, fashioned from sticks, thatch, black plastic 
bags 
Thousands of empty plastic water jugs, discarded along trails 
Blue jeans, flannel shirts, knit caps, socks, shoes, boots, padded coats strewn amongst 
brush near dead-end desert road 
Pair of women’s briefs tied to the branch of a tree 
 
Barriers to Effecting Distributions 
Commentators on moral distance and related issues have identified a wide range 
of barriers to the acknowledgment and discharge of duties to distant others. Those would 
include psychological tendencies to favor members of one’s own perceived in-groups 
(Brewer and Gardner 1996), and tendencies toward avoiding the direct contemplation of 
acute need or suffering (Mayerfeld 1999, 189-93). Related tendencies are identified 
toward blaming individuals for their own plight, as well as reinforcements to looking 
inward provided by nationally focused media, educational and governing institutions. I 
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am most concerned here, in the context of both the first and second problems, with 
barriers related to the lack of voice, the lack of formal input mechanisms, or the plain 
lack of visibility for those who are relationally or geographically distant.  
In regard to the first problem, the setting of moral boundaries, it is often the case 
that those offering arguments for limiting the scope of distributions to compatriots almost 
exclusively (Richard Miller 1998), or to a lesser but still significant extent (David Miller 
2007), take steps toward including the perspective of noncompatriots, but that they 
engage in very incomplete such exercises. Consider the following observations from 
David Miller, offered within an extended, explicitly non-cosmopolitan argument for a 
conception of global justice that would mandate relatively strong priority to co-nationals 
in distributions. Miller relates his emotions as he views television news reports 
addressing cases of suffering by individuals in developing states. He notes being moved 
by the suffering, but also wondering in each case whether much of the responsibility for it 
shouldn’t be ascribed to the individuals themselves, or members of their local or national 
communities. For example, when he considers a report on would-be unauthorized 
immigrants being shot and beaten while trying to rush the fences between Moroccan 
territory and Spain’s north African enclave Melilla in 2005, 
I find my sympathy for the young African men who are trying to cross the 
fence tempered by a kind of indignation. Surely, they must understand that 
this is not the way to get into Europe. What clearer indication could there 
be of the proposition that illegal immigrants are not welcome than a double 
fence up to six metres tall with rolls of razor wire along the top? Do they 
think they have some kind of natural right to enter Spain in defiance of the 
laws that apply to everyone else who might like to move there? … 
Although I can understand their plight, which must indeed be desperate if 
they are willing to try, time and again, to risk life and limb to get across the 




We can observe in this account a nod toward an appreciation of the dire 
circumstances in which any individual presumably must be to attempt such a potentially 
dangerous entry. There is little evidence, however, of any attempt to fully understand 
those circumstances, the individuals’ motivations and considered choices. Several 
questions are raised by Miller about the mindset of those scaling the walls, yet they are 
left as rhetorical questions, with the implication that it should be obvious that such 
individuals do not act rightly when they jump the queue, as well as an implied refusal to 
weigh such individuals’ understandings of their own rights claims more clearly against 
the moral values associated with maintaining a robust national community. In short, there 
is some movement toward trying to understand the lives of excluded others, but it 
remains a very limited attempt, in large part because their own voices remain excluded. 
 In the current global system, those arguably most in need of being able to press 
their own distributive claims to the global surplus are not generally at the table. While 
states may jointly discuss distributive or relief efforts in such fora as the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals meetings, they independently and internally determine 
the depth of their own external distributive obligations. I have discussed at some length 
elsewhere how this feature of the Westphalian states system can reinforce a tendency 
toward own-case bias, where individuals or groups, in the absence of impartial 
adjudication, tend to strongly favor their own interpretations of appropriate obligations, 
etc. (Cabrera 2004, Ch. 4). Recent findings in social psychology reinforce that such a 
tendency is widespread, and that individuals are subject to a kind of naive realism, where 
they tend to perceive their own actions or interpretations as unbiased (see Ehrlinger, 
Gilovich, and Ross 2005; see Pronin, Gilovich and Ross 2004). Further, individuals often 
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perceive that members of their own group will be able to make an unbiased judgment on 
the resolution of particular issues, including allocations of valuable resources, while 
members of other groups are expected to demonstrate bias in favor of their own group 
members (Ehrlinger, Gilovich and Ross, 2005). The fact that the voices of those in need 
in the current system are generally excluded from internal debates over possible global 
duties means, in part, that biases inherent in understandings within affluent states about 
external duties will not be open to robust challenge by those outside, and solipsistic 
understandings of very limited duties will be reinforced. That can be viewed as a 
significant barrier to possibilities for securing the acknowledgment of such duties by 
those within affluent states. 
 
* * * 
 
Baby carriage, folding portable style, wheels worn by desert travel 
Photo, young man and woman in church plaza 
Certificate of confirmation, Diocese of Texcoco, Mexico, for Guadalupe Santos Perez 
Certificate of good conduct for Guadalupe Santos Perez, from Secretariat of Public 
Education, Tlacotepec de Benito Juárez, Mexico 
Certificate of civil registration, Julian Santos Perez, brother of Guadalupe Santos Perez, 
born September 22, 1983 
Baby bottle, imprinted with red `Elmo’ character, cracked by exposure 
 
Empathy and Helping Behavior 
One potentially important step toward the kind of distributive inclusion advocated 
by cosmopolitan theorists is to make excluded individuals more present in arguments for 
it. For insight on how qualitative political theory specifically could promote a fuller 
acknowledgment of the potential claims of the excluded other, I will consider recent work 
on empathy and altruism in social and cognitive psychology. First, however, I will 
consider another proposed use of psychologists’ insights on altruism for actually 
 10
shrinking moral distance, particularly in terms of the second problem identified above, of 
how to overcome barriers to distributions even when moral obligation has generally been 
acknowledged.  Difficulties encountered by this argument should highlight the 
importance of focusing first on ways to promote the perspective taking and other factors 
highlighted in the empathy-altruism literature for motivating helping behaviors. 
 Judith Lichtenberg discounts possibilities for making human suffering on the 
whole less abstract, or higher among the priorities of those in affluent states, saying 
`Most people only have so much psychological room to feel each others’ pain’ (2004, p. 
88). Instead, she notes experimental findings that individuals are more giving, as well as 
more fair in an allocation of resources, if others know how much they are giving, or if it 
is known how they are dividing the resource (2004, p. 87). The solution to actually 
motivating overseas giving, she argues, is the promulgation of a norm of such giving 
reinforced by publicity about who gives how much. Thus would a sort of shame reflex be 
activated in those who failed to give at a level matching that of their peers. Lichtenberg 
does acknowledge the difficulty of motivating the initial launch of such a scheme, and 
she suggests it would need  `freethinking, free-acting individuals who set an example that 
others are inspired or otherwise motivated to follow, or else think about new ways to 
design our institutions’ to encourage giving according to the psychological principles she 
outlines (2004, p. 94).  
 I will note again that such an argument operates within the framework of the 
second problem. Lichtenberg presumes that the case for making overseas distributions is 
essentially self-evident, given the contrasting affluence and deep deprivation in separate 
regions of the world. It is difficult, however, to see why individuals would feel compelled 
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by some shame reflex to give overseas specifically. In the absence of a fairly compelling 
initial argument or set of arguments for giving stronger priority than at present to 
overseas giving, it would seem more likely that such giving would be conditioned by 
common understandings of compatriot priority and be directed inward. That is, the first 
problem of moral distance, of determining where the outward boundaries of the 
distributive set should be placed, has yet to be overcome. I believe Lichtenberg does 
point us in a very fruitful direction when she notes the need to move away from a reliance 
on the altruistic impulses of individuals to address overseas poverty, and toward an 
emphasis on whatever kinds of normative or especially institutional changes conceivably 
could routinize distributions. An important prior stage to such institutional 
transformation, however, will be finding ways to motivate a deeper consideration for the 
interests of the excluded other.  
 A significant separate psychology literature has explored the circumstances under 
which individuals will be willing to engage in genuinely altruistic behavior, i.e., take 
action in behalf of others that cannot be said to be rooted in self-interest. Reported levels 
of empathic concern, while not proposed as the sole cause or predictor of actual helping 
behavior, have been consistently associated with a willingness by participants to aid 
subjects, including when the subject is a stranger (Batson 1997; Eisenberg and Miller 
1987; see Duan and Hill 1996; Preston and Waal 2002). Empathy is measured according 
to scores reported by participants in reference to how strongly they feel toward a subject, 
e.g., by a 1-7 ranking on such adjectives as sympathetic, compassionate, moved. Further, 
empathy for the subject is distinguished from sadness or distress caused by a subject’s 
suffering, where participants can be motivated by egoistic reasons to end the suffering 
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and thus end or lessen their own distress at witnessing it (Dovidio, Allen and Schroeder 
1990).  
Among factors contributing to empathic concern, experiments dating back several 
decades have highlighted the importance of perspective taking. Those study participants 
instructed to imagine how a subject feels in a given situation are observed to develop 
increased concern and willingness to aid. More recent work has emphasized also the 
significance of a participants’ positive valuation of the welfare of the subject in need 
(Batson et al. 2007). The importance of such welfare valuing is underscored, for example, 
in a series of experiments conducted by Batson and colleagues, in which participants are 
asked to consider the case of a young man whom they were told had been seriously 
injured running through traffic while late for class. Some subjects were told the young 
man had been late because he stopped to help an elderly woman who was lost and 
disoriented. Others also were told that he was late because he had been approached by the 
woman, but that he rudely rejected her request for help (Batson et al. 2007, p. 69). 
Participants reported higher empathic concern for the nice subject than the rude one, in 
other words, for the one whose welfare they had greater reason to value. Further, those 
also instructed to perspective take, or imagine how the young man must be feeling, 
reported significantly higher empathic concern.  
Of central importance here, higher empathic concern was associated with a much 
greater willingness to help the young man. Participants, who were told the events had 
actually happened and the subject was temporarily confined to a wheel chair, were asked 
if they would render aid to him in the form of regularly delivering notes to an office. No 
contact was expected with him, to ensure that any motivation to help would be intrinsic, 
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rather than based on some extrinsic benefit to the participants such as gratitude. Those 
who had reported higher empathy were significantly more willing to take on the task 
(Batson et al. 2007, 266-68). 
Such studies provide key insight into factors that can encourage a willingness to 
render aid. When individuals are provided with information that helps them to understand 
the life circumstances, actions and motivations of others, it can promote a willingness to 
adopt others’ perspective, to develop concern for them, and to be more inclined to aid 
them. Batson and colleagues note that the role played by the valuing of the other suggests 
that empathic concern—and the prosocial motivation it produces—can be increased if we 
increase valuing of others’ welfare. Such valuing may be increased through strategies 
designed to reduce prejudice; to improve attitudes toward out-groups; or to produce more 
positive, cooperative social interactions’ (Batson et al. 2007, p. 73).  
I will note that an emphasis on the underlying bases of empathy-related altruism 
does not necessarily commit my account to an externalist neo-Humean. or related 
`sentimentalist’ position on moral motivation. Such positions presume generally that even 
after one accepts the correctness of a particular moral position, some additional factor 
such as sympathy for the other must be present to motivate action in accordance with that 
position (Slote 2006; see Dreier 2000; Finlay 2007, p. 105). Opposing `anti-Humean’ or 
internalist positions presume that to believe that something is morally appropriate is to 
also have the motivation to act on that belief (Nagel 1978; see Rosati 2006). For example, 
Nagel has argued that an essential characteristic of altruism is that it `depends on a 
recognition of the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard 
oneself as merely one individual among many’ (1978, p. 3). Altruism properly 
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understood is not, he emphasizes, motivated by some bare feeling of sympathy or  
generalized affection for the human race,’ (1978, p. 3) but is one possible outcome of a 
rational process, part of which involves a willingness to fully consider the reality, or in 
terms of the present discussion, humanity, of the other.2  
The empathy-altruism path, where information about the other can lead to positive 
valuation of welfare, attempted perspective taking and some willingness to aid, is 
consistent with such an emphasis on considering the humanity of others, and would be 
prior to the actual setting of moral boundaries described in the first problem of moral 
distance.  Further, and where both the first and second problems of moral distance are 
concerned, we can note that even if moral reasons for acting can by themselves motivate 
action, many such reasons or considerations may compete for our attention. As Thomas 
Scanlon has argued, `One’s state of mind, the state of one’s body, and the content of 
one’s immediate experiences strongly affect the reasons one attends to’ (1998, 34). The 
motivational effects or weight of given moral considerations may change in part, he 
notes, because changing circumstances bring particular considerations more vividly to 
mind.  
 
Narratives and Perspective Taking 
 My claim is that the interests of excluded others can be brought more vividly to 
mind through the promotion of perspective taking and related positive valuation. In fact, 
                                                 
2 That is not to claim that Nagel sees his approach as grounding extensive duties to noncompatriots. He has 
argued elsewhere that global distributive justice should be viewed as at best an impasse, where the 
relatively affluent can reasonably reject the full demands of the less-affluent, and the less-affluent can 
reasonably reject the distributions the affluent might be willing to give (Nagel 1991, Ch. 7). In fact, the 
sense of reasonable in such a claim might more accurately be read as the kind of naive realism, or sincerely 
held belief in the objectivity of one’s own opinion, described in the psychological literature. Individuals 
may be acting in good faith in considering the depth of their own obligations, but their judgments likely 
will be subject to the kinds of biases identified above. 
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the importance of perspective taking in particular has been emphasized in a range of 
social and institutional contexts. For example, on a relatively small scale, a perspective-
taking strategy commonly is adopted in the training of physicians, when they view and 
discuss dramatic films focusing on patients’ experience of illness (Shapiro and Rucker 
2004; Benbassat and Baumal 2004). On a somewhat larger scale, Martha Nussbaum has 
highlighted the importance of perspective taking in arguments for a fundamentally 
multicultural and global approach to university education, as well as for a more 
comprehensively informed approach to passing legal judgment (Nussbaum 1997; 1999). 
Both education and judicial reasoning, she suggests, should be informed in part by a 
model of engagement with texts that emphasizes the `participatory identification’ with 
agents or literary characters. In such a model, `the reader, following the author’s lead, 
comes to be inhabited by the tangled complexities and struggles of other concrete lives’ 
(Nussbaum 1999, 170). In the courtroom in particular, salient details from a defendant’s 
life can help to promote understanding and perspective taking, which can lead to more 
informed decisions about the mitigating factors that should be considered in passing legal 
judgment. As in the model emphasized here, Nussbaum does not recommend a 
deliberation based on pity or other unreflective emotion for the other, but one informed 
by an identification with the other based in a fuller understanding of that person’s life 
circumstances.  
On a larger scale still, the power of written narratives has been displayed in those 
works that have moved readers to moral outrage, helping to promote substantive social 
change. Elaine Scarry notes E.M. Forster’s Passage to India as turning the tide in British 
willingness to allow Indian independence, and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s 
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Cabin as a work that  `made Blacks—the weight, solidity, injurability of their 
personhood—imaginable to the White population in pre-Civil War United States’ (2002, 
p. 104-05). Scarry asserts that such influential works likely are too rare or singular for 
their power to be generalized. We could note, however, Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath for 
humanizing the U.S. Dust Bowl emigrants of the 1930s, the Victorian social novels of 
Dickens, Hardy and others for the ways in which they helped bring the plight of Britain’s 
working class to light, and so on. This is not to suggest that political theorists must 
develop the narrative genius of the great novelist, but to illustrate how identification with 
individuals through texts can help to make more vivid the interests and humanity of 
excluded others. 
We also can consider the power of a global media, in particular television, to help 
identify others in need, make their need more present to individuals in a position to 
render aid, and generally to promote the transfer of such aid. The power of TV cameras to 
so shrink moral distance arguably was demonstrated in the Ethiopian famine of the mid-
1980s, the Somalia intervention of the early 1990s (Mandelbaum 1994), and the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami (Inderfurth, Fabrycky, and Cohen, 2005). As media scholars have 
emphasized, one of the fundamental characteristics of news coverage that has proved 
most influential on foreign aid and intervention is that it has sympathetically portrayed 
suffering people (Robinson 2000; see Half 1987).  
It might be asked then why portrayals of the distant needy should not simply be 
left to journalists, especially if their media have such power to effect actual transfers. 
This can be answered both on a theoretical and practical level. In terms of theory, while 
television accounts in particular may have great power to motivate charitable responses 
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by viewers in the near term, they do not constitute careful arguments about where moral 
boundaries should be set. They do not interrogate distinctions between presumably 
charitable – meaning also optional – transfers, and transfers that may be required by 
general duties or specific obligations of justice incumbent on all. Further, underlying a 
concern with moral boundaries is a concern with the way in which television accounts of 
crisis may motivate transfers. That is, rather than promoting the kind of valuing and 
perspective taking that is grounded in insight into the life of the other, they may promote 
a more ephemeral emotive response, e.g., pity for those in an abject state. That is not to 
say that such transfers should be discouraged, but rather that the television portrayals of 
individuals in need do not cover the same ground as rigorous political theory arguments 
concerned with moral distance that also would include such portrayals. The same would 
be true of an exclusive focus on portrayals in narrative non-fiction accounts, though some 
may provide powerful supporting material (see Nazario 2006).   
In practical terms, i.e., in terms of the second problem of moral distance, it can be 
noted that media coverage of global crises actually can contribute to a skewed allocation 
of aid resources, even a diversion of resources from other chronic needs in the global 
South (Jakobsen 2000). That is in part a function of how instances of need are selected 
for specific coverage emphasis. Factors that can come into play include the `emergency’ 
character of the need, the skill with which it is publicized by NGOs and other advocates, 
and some calculations of short-term political costs and benefits by officials in intervening 
or aiding states (Mermin 1997; Bob 2002). Thus, while the response to intensive media 
coverage of a famine or other episode of desperate can help to demonstrate the power of 
one type of narrative or portrayal to promote transfers, the media `crisis response’ model 
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would seem inappropriate as the sole or primary means of providing information aimed at 
setting appropriate moral boundaries. There is a potentially significant role for qualitative 
political theory to play. 
 
Qualitative Political Theory  
Qualitative research in general is commonly employed in the generation of 
hypotheses, especially in its grounded theory variant (Strauss and Corbin 1998), as well 
as to explore more deeply the understandings of participants in a phenomenon under 
study, and to investigate social phenomena that may not be so readily explicable within 
approaches focusing on formalizing, quantifying, and statistically testing variables 
(Babbie 1998, 279-306). Qualitative methods can include the conducting and thematic-
content coding of interviews with participants or elites in a set of events or an 
organization (Weston et al. 2001; Aberbach and Rockman 2002). They can include field 
observations and artifact analysis, participant-observation within specific groups, the 
linguistic analysis of salient narratives or texts, structured field experiments, and a range 
of other means outside of the strict quantification of data points. 
The use of qualitative methods in political theory arguably was pioneered by Jane 
Mansbridge (1983), who drew on her extensive observations, interviews and other 
research at a Vermont town meeting, as well as a participatory workplace, to inform her 
models of adversarial democracy and the more consensus-based unitary democracy. 
Mansbridge noted the range of ways in which conducting fine-grained empirical research 
had contributed to a fuller understanding of the elements at play in the democratic theory 
arguments she was attempting to make, in particular in illuminating the moral 
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understandings of participants themselves. More recently, theorists have used insights 
from qualitative research to provide essential building blocks for the construction of their 
normative accounts. Brooke Ackerly, for example, draws on semi-structured interviews 
and interactions with human rights activists at major international meetings such as the 
World Social Forum to develop an immanent theory of human rights, one that would 
have universal application but is aimed at being highly attuned to difference (2008, 149). 
Qualitative, or experience-based modes of inquiry are foundational, Ackerly argues, in 
helping the theorist of human rights understand the importance of adopting not a 
totalizing but destabilizing epistemology connected to often radically different 
conceptions of rights espoused by activist-practitioners (2008, 144).  
Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit (2007) likewise incorporate extensive 
interview research with social service providers and disadvantaged persons to inform 
their revision of Martha Nussbaum’s list of essential human capabilities, toward 
developing a rubric for identifying and addressing social disadvantage that could be 
adopted by policy makers. Roxanne Doty (2006) adopts a qualitative case study approach 
for her defense and elaboration of Derrida’s (2001) conception of unconditional 
hospitality in a cosmopolitan frame. She draws on field research with the Humane 
Borders group, which maintains water stations along trails heavily used by unauthorized 
immigrants in desert of southern Arizona, where more than a thousand have died in the 
past decade of thirst and exposure, among other causes. Separately, Doty (2007) has used 
field research among civilian border-patrol `Minuteman’ volunteers to test claims 
embedded in a Schmittian conception of state sovereignty. 
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In recent work, I have used data from field interviews, participant-observation and 
some formal surveys to inform normative arguments for a specific approach to global 
citizenship (Cabrera 2008; Cabrera and Glavac forthcoming). I have collected and 
systematically coded qualitative data from interviews conducted with members of 
migrant-rights and immigration-restriction groups in the United States, Mexico, and 
Western Europe. Coding has involved the identification of recurring themes and phrase 
patterns in interviews, and comparing theme-coded responses among the different subject 
groups to determine how members of those groups understand their own actions or 
attitudes toward the non-citizen other (see Weston et al. 2001). Extensive data from 
interviews with unauthorized immigrants from Mexico and Central America in the 
United States, and from Central American in Mexico, also have provided insight on the 
experiences and motivations of migrants themselves.  
I want to focus here on one portion of my qualitative research that may have 
particular salience to the problems of perceived moral distance. This portion or project, 
titled an `Archaeology of Borders', has focused on a phenomenon where, piece by piece, 
those who cross into the United States through southern Arizona drop their possessions. 
Seeking to lighten their loads in the broiling sun, or overcome by the incongruity of 
bearing high-heeled shoes, bottles of cologne, or a store of school certificates and other 
personal documents on a trek stretching into days, they transform the desert trails into 
archaeological troves of sorts (see Doty 2006; Hyatt 2007). These artifacts have been 
collected both at random by myself and others on some high-use trails, and more 
systematically with research teams at migrant pickup sites, where crossers are ordered by 
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their guides to drop all of their possessions in order that as many people as possible can 
be crammed into a smuggling vehicle.  
Teams documented hundreds of items at two pickup sites in April 2006, and other 
items were found on more than a dozen Arizona routes from June 2005-March 2007. 
Throughout the project, I have been struck by the ways in which a mute, dusty trail so 
often reveals more about the sufferings endured than individual crossers are willing to tell 
in an interview or even repeated close interactions. A full accounting of items found is 
not possible in the space of this article, but a discussion of some key ones should be 
suggestive of the insight that can be gained, and ways in which the analysis of such 
artifacts can help to make others’ lives more vivid. For example, volunteers for 
Samaritans and No More Deaths, southern Arizona groups that conduct humanitarian 
patrols in search of stranded crossers, report finding the most personal of Spanish-
language correspondence left in the desert. One letter, apparently never delivered, was 
written from a mother to her child, explaining why she had been forced to leave him 
behind to try to improve both their lives. A notebook was discovered containing the 
extended musings of a young woman discovering her feelings for a man. The following 
letter from a distressed young woman was found at a rest site on a heavily traveled 
migrant trail near Arivaca, Arizona, some 15 miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border: 
 (December 29, 2004) 
  
For: a very special person...you 
 I hope that you reflect [obscured]… because that's really what I feel toward you and I 
don't want you to get offended, but it's the truth.  You know that you have failed me and I 
forgave you and have tried to trust you, and I have but every time I do, you do something 
that disappoints me and erases everything again.  I don't know what you really want; if 
you don't want to be in this house, leave and we will understand even though it will 
hurt. …  My character is very strong like yours but you hurt me and you know how I am, 
and unfortunately I'm very prideful just like you are.  And what you did to us two years 
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ago I will never forget because my heart is hurt and I don't think that it can heal and 
much less that I forget with your ---- desire to change.  Every time you drink, I get mad 
because like we say now you act like a goat’ [idiomatic expression] and you don't even 
know who you are or what you're doing here. …3 
   
Photographs have their own stories to tell. In one, found on a desert trail in 
southeastern Arizona, a young man and woman are standing in a tree-shaded plaza before 
a white, mission-style church. His right arm is around her shoulders, and he holds in his 
left hand an 8-x-12-inch, framed photograph of a robed Christ in welcoming pose, hands 
at sides and open. Documents chronicle years of schoolwork diligently performed, births 
in the tiny mountain villages of southern Mexico, the names of parents and grandparents 
left behind. Blankets, bottles, and tiny articles of clothing bear witness to babies being 
carried by their parents through cactus and the clawing thorns of mesquite trees. Older 
children leave behind toys, soccer cards, and novelty cards that come inside packages of 
sliced bread. One boy left a notebook in which he had been practicing sketches of zany 
card characters such as  Juan Mucho-pus,’ a skinny muchacho with acne the size of golf 
balls.  
The desert can tell stories of compassion, even heroism, as in a stretcher found at 
the bottom of a steep hill, fashioned from sticks, shirts, and a leather belt imprinted with 
the letters `USA’. Some group of crossers had refused to leave a companion behind, 
instead taking the time to construct the stretcher and bear him or her over the hill, on a 
trail that is treacherous with rolling rocks under the best of circumstances. Other artifacts 
are more grim. Teams at the two pickup sites found 14 separate packets of powerful 
pseudoephedrine pills, allergy medicine commonly given by  coyote’ guides to their 
charges to increase walking speed and endurance. The medicine has been found to 
                                                 
3 Translated from the Spanish by Esmeralda Gonzalez.  
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aggravate hypertension and cause other cardiovascular ill effects (Juhn 2003), and it 
likely contributes to desert deaths. The pair of women’s briefs tied to a tree branch, noted 
above, is widely understood in the borderlands to represent a trophy of rape, and assaults 
on female crossers in remote areas are all too common. For example, a woman, six 
months pregnant, aided by Mexican federal authorities in the border town of Nogales 
after a failed crossing, reported that both she and her nine-year-old daughter had been 
raped by a gang of men who abducted them from their crossing group (Author interview, 
Grupo Beta, Nogales, February 2007).   
A more complete accounting of the field research would offer additional detail on 
the objects found, their uses and significance to the crossers. It also would include the 
voices of the dozens of crossers interviewed, their insights on the hardships they had 
endured on the trail to the United States or Europe, on the reasons why they felt 
compelled to journey north and what they believed would be waiting for them. For 
example, a young Nigerian woman, Gloria, contacted in southern Spain, said she had 
been determined to escape the deep poverty of her home village and move to a place 
where she could make more use of the English-language and other skills she had gained 
as a child under the tutelage of a female missionary. After leaving, she spent six years 
living in the shadows of Northern Africa, including around the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, 
and its sister city Melilla, noted by David Miller above. Interviewed in an immigrant-
women’s facility in the city of Algeciras, where she was being sheltered with her six-
month-old daughter, Rosio, she recalled initially crossing the vast desert of Algeria on 
foot, trying to reach Europe. `In the desert, many perish walking. I saw a baby die, and 
many other people. It was many kilometers walking, many’. In Algeria, she huddled with 
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fifty others like her. `We were afraid to go out. The police would beat you’. Later, in 
Morocco, she adopted fully body coverings and veil and begged in the streets. There she 
was beaten harshly by police, she said, making clubbing motions, showing a still-shiny 
scar running the length of her right cheek. `They beat me when I was pregnant. They 
don’t care. They have no respect for life’.  
Respite arrived in the form of a smuggling-gang broker who had ties to her home 
area in Nigeria and was willing to arrange her transport for a promise to pay 1250 Euros 
after arrival. After false starts, she finally was crowded into a small boat with many 
others, bound for the Spanish coast near Algeciras.  The water was very rough. The boat 
started shaking, she said, recalling the other passengers bailing madly while she clung to 
the side, hugely pregnant and struggling not to vomit as water slapped against her face 
and entered her mouth and nostrils. `I thought we were all going to die.’ Then, just as 
they seemed to cross the international boundary to Spanish waters, the seas calmed. The 
boat motored to the coast near Tarifa, where Spanish authorities captured them and took 
her to the shelter. There, Rosio was born and given a Spanish name to promote her 
acceptance, while her mother struggled to gain permission for a work permit (Author 
interview, March 2006). 
Stories and artifacts from the lives of those who are excluded from some 
distributions of resources and opportunities do not by themselves constitute an argument 
in defense of any principle of global justice. Again, however, they can help to make more 
vivid the humanity of those beyond the razor wire. Presenting the life circumstances of 
those others, and giving them voice with which to share their own perspectives, can make 
it more difficult to blithely dismiss their claims for forms of inclusion. Further, it can 
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challenge a form of own-case bias that is prevalent in non-cosmopolitan distributive 
arguments that would emphasize shared national sentiment (D. Miller 2007), or sacrifices 
made in behalf of compatriots by compatriots (R. Miller 1998; see Blake 2001). The 
latter kinds of arguments constitute a form of discussion about distributive obligations 
that is solipsistic by nature, generally considering only sacrifices already being made 
within a group, while ignoring the deprivations that can attend exclusions from 
membership, as well as the fundamental question of whether such exclusions were 
initially justified. In the words of an Algerian man who had made it past the fence and 
was being detained as an unauthorized entrant to Ceuta: `We know in Algeria that Spain 
was like us. Until it joined the EU, people had to leave to find work. Now everyone wants 
to get into Spain. Why can’t we have that?’ (Author interview, March 2006). 
This question, far from being rhetorical, would seem to demand a reasoned 
response that does more fully consider the interests and plain humanity of such excluded 
others. It implies an argument for formal inclusion, one that would move far beyond 
exhortations to charity across borders. In fact, Scarry (2002), like Lichtenberg (2004), 
criticizes approaches to promoting noncompatriot distributions that would rely solely on 
exhortations to charity. As we saw, Lichtenberg aims to move us toward a structure of 
norms that would promote publicity about giving and motivate it largely through non-
altruistic means. Scarry moves one step farther, emphasizing the potential for suitably 
constructed or reformed domestic constitutions to mitigate conceptions of `foreignness’ 
or exclusions of outsiders. I have argued elsewhere that such institutional transformation 
should be advocated, but that it should be more fundamentally supranational in nature, in 
order to better meet the challenges of own-case bias (Cabrera 2004, Ch 7; Cabrera 2005). 
 26
It could include, for example, movement toward a form of North American union, 
broadly similar to the European Union, where development aid would be more 
intensively distributed across borders and the movement of labor would be freed over 
time (see Manley, et al. 2005; Fox 2007, 101). In moving toward such a system, 
individuals from less-affluent states would have more opportunities to tell their own 
stories, press their own interests, and demand formal standing in debates about where to 
place moral boundaries. 
We need not presume, however, that qualitative political theory is applicable to 
questions of moral distance only if it is incorporated into an institutional cosmopolitan 
account. Those cosmopolitans demanding less comprehensive institutional changes also 
could strengthen their accounts through making the perspectives and actual welfare of the 
globally excluded more visible, making their lives more vivid by enabling them to relate 
their concerns in their own voices. Such inclusion would help to better ensure that those 
in affluent states, who are being asked to share the resources, opportunities and other 
goods they have understood as belonging to them by birthright, are encouraged to fully 
appreciate needy noncompatriots as discrete individuals whose welfare should be valued, 
and whose claims for distributive inclusion cannot be dismissed out of hand. Finally, the 
inclusion of the voices and lives of excluded others could enhance not only accounts 
based primarily in positive duties toward all others, but also those grounded in negative 
duties to mitigate harms ostensibly caused by those in affluent states through the 
imposition of global institutions (Pogge 2002). Each kind of account could be 
strengthened by making more vivid the impacts of deprivation or impositions on 
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excluded individuals, and most centrally, by engaging with those persons’ own 
understandings of the appropriate extent of moral boundaries. 
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